THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY:
ALFRED SCHUTZ

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In his many writings Alfred Schutz conceived his work variously as a "philosophy investigating the presuppositions" of daily life, as a "piece of phenomenological psychology," and, in his last papers, as "the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude." The fundamental theme of all his work, however, was the problem of intersubjectivity, in spite of the fact that he was, regrettably, prevented from developing a detailed theory on that problem. Seeking, on the one hand, to probe the roots of commonsense reality and, on the other, to furnish a foundation for the social sciences, Schutz was led at every point to the problem of intersubjectivity, as Scheler and Dilthey were before him.

The essence of the social world, conceived as the constituted texture of meaningfully interlocking activities of actors on the social scene, was for him its commonness, the fact that it is a world shared by the multiplicity of individuals living and acting within it, in mutually interlocking activities. Because of this


commonness, all the sciences that have to do with this world, or part of it, have intersubjectivity as their fundamental category of understanding; that is, intersubjectivity is not an explicit problem for these sciences. Hence all empirical social sciences, beginning with the socio-cultural world as already given, presuppose as their ground "the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude"—that inquiry which has as its fundamental theme the problem of intersubjectivity. For the same reason, inquiry into intersubjectivity cannot avail itself of either the methods or the theories belonging to the empirical social sciences, but must be developed as an autonomous discipline, one taking its clues and methods from the phenomenon itself.

An initial difficulty thus presents itself: how to make intersubjectivity itself thematic, how to bring it to presentedness apart from all theories, interpretations, and assumptions regarding it. Further crucial difficulties are presented by the description and analysis of intersubjectivity as a genuine phenomenon in its own right. The mere fact that we are all actors on the social scene, concretely engaged in a variety of intersubjective relations, by no means guarantees that we can forthwith grasp the significance and structures of these relationships, any more than we can all become shoemakers because we all have feet. As Schutz emphasizes, in agreement with Scheler, the problem appears on a variety of levels, each presenting its own specific problems. For Schutz's particular concerns, the problem of intersubjectivity is primarily "intramundane." It is one that lies at the root of all the social sciences and at the heart of our existence—that is, "the concrete understanding of the Other whose existence is taken for granted." As he expresses it in one of his last articles, "So long as men are

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8 As Marcel puts it, what is lived at the level of concrete social action is a category of thought for the interpretation of that experience. Or, as Maurice Natanson states concisely, "The category is made possible by the experience and then the category makes possible the interpretation of the experience"; "Existential Categories in Contemporary Literature," in Carolina Quarterly (1959) p. 25.

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born of mothers, intersubjectivity and the 'We-relation' found all other categories of human being.”

I

In order to grasp the significance of intersubjectivity as an “intra-mundane” problem, it is necessary first to characterize, if only briefly, Schutz’s investigations of “what makes the social world ‘tick,’” as he often put it. To make the exposition manageable, it must be restricted to only one stratum of the social world: “paramount reality,” as distinguished from the world of dreams, of scientific theory, of games, and the like. The world in which I find myself at any moment in my “wide-awake” living is at the outset peopled with others, not only individuals with whom I am acquainted and others whom I know less well or not at all, or groups of others equally well or less well known to me, but also a multiplicity of “products” of the activities of others (“cultural” objects, institutions, values, and the like), all of which intrinsically refer to others.

Aside from this, however, the world in which I live, work, and act is taken for granted by me as my reality; so far as I must come to terms with it and take my bearings within it, I must understand it, and to this extent it is given to my experience and interpretation. I take it for granted that this world existed before I did and will continue to exist after my death, and that it was and will be a socio-cultural world organized and interpreted by my predecessors and successors in a way typically similar to the way in which I myself organize and interpret it. In so far as it refers to the world handed down to me, this assumption combines with the knowledge derived from my own experience to form my “stock of knowledge at hand.” In terms of this progressively sedimented stock of experiences, the objects, facts, and events I encounter and deal with in the course of my life are experienced as “things of such and such a kind,” in other words as types (“dogs,” “trees,” “strangers,” and so on).

This world is at once the framework and the object of my ac-
To carry out my projects I must act on it, change it, and experience its resistance to my efforts; thus, in my paramount reality, my interest is preeminently pragmatic. Moreover, my world is oriented and organized for my actions in a spatio-temporal continuum, with my actual “here” and “now” functioning as the center “O” of a system of coordinates determining the organization of my surrounding field. As such, my world is organized into a hierarchy of zones within my actual, potential, and restorable reach, within which is my immediately available “manipulatory sphere,” with its own typical spatio-temporal horizons. These zones of interlocking actual and potential experiences are taken for granted by me as the unquestioned, but always questionable, matrix of my actions. Thus, by means of the basic idealizations that Husserl calls the “I can do it again” and the “and so forth,” my concrete situation is constituted as an on-going course of typical experiences of typical objects and events.

At any moment, then, I find myself in a biographically determined situation, which, though it is only in small part due to me myself, I must define and come to terms with. For me, not to act in a particular situation is as constitutive of my biographical situation as if I were to “gear” into the outer world with an acting-performing. Hence my situation is historical, it is the sedimentation of all my previous experiences, and is brought to bear at every moment of my life. How I define my situation, how I select these instead of those circumstances and objects as relevant or irrelevant, depends on what my “purpose at hand” is at the moment in question, and ultimately on what my “plan of life” is. This fact reveals the motive structure at the heart of all acting. In spite of our common vernacular, which allows us to express every kind of motive by the term “because,” we must distinguish from the “because motive” the “in-order-to motive.” In so far as I am actually engaged in my on-going acting, my motive is always of the “in-order-to” type (I move my arm in order to pick up the glass); my “because motive” appears only on reflection (I picked up the glass because I was thirsty). The “in-order-to motive”
refers intrinsically to the future, to what is going to be accomplished in and by my acting; the "because motive" refers to what has already been accomplished. Finally, every element of my everyday knowledge has a necessarily equivocal trait: if I say "S is p," I in my natural attitude also recognize that S is q, r, and t as well. In so far as I take this for granted, however, these possibilities are not contradictory, for I now take S as p for my particular purposes at hand, and ignore as irrelevant to these purposes the "q-ness," "r-ness," and "t-ness" of S.

An everyday knowledge of the world is, then, a system of constructs of its typicality. We have thus far ignored, however, the fact that this world is fundamentally a common world, one shared with others. In my natural attitude I take it for granted that others, fellowmen, exist; I take it for granted that they will act in ways typically similar to mine, will be motivated by typically similar motives, will take my actions in substantially the same way as I mean them; and I assume that my fellowmen, in turn, take my own acting and motives as typically similar to theirs. This commonness of the world has several dimensions. There are, in the first place, my contemporaries, with whom I am interconnected in mutual action and reaction and who thus live "at the same (historical, objective) time" as I; secondly, my successors, of whom no experience by me is possible, but toward whom I may and do direct my actions; thirdly, my predecessors, on whose world I cannot act, but whose actions and products are handed down to me in the form of a tradition that I can modify, partially reject, accept, or take for granted. But since all social relationships and the other dimensions of social reality derive from and are founded on "my contemporaries," more particularly "my consociates," those whom I encounter in the "face-to-face relation," the problem of intersubjectivity is to be met with fundamentally on this level.

Intersubjectivity as an "intramundane" problem concerns, then, this taken-for-granted commonness of the world of daily life. "How is a common world," Schutz asks, "in terms of common intentionalities possible?" How, that is to say, does it come about
that in spite of the fact that I, being “here” and the center “O” for a system of coordinates defining my surrounding world, and you, being “there” and the center “O” for a similar set of coordinates defining your surrounding world (you forming a part of my surrounding world, and me forming a part of yours)—how do we come to have something in common (an object, a project, ultimately a common world)? How is it possible that although I cannot live in your seeing of things, cannot feel your love and hatred, cannot have an immediate and direct perception of your mental life as it is for you—how is it possible that I can nevertheless share your thoughts, feelings, and attitudes? For Schutz the “problem” of intersubjectivity is here encountered in its full force.

II

What has been described thus far as the “paramount” reality is paramount mainly because communication (the primary vehicle of which is language) “can occur only within the reality of the outer world,” that is, within the everyday “working” world. But, Schutz asks, is then communication, whether by means of the spoken word, the expressive gesture, or a non-cognitive communicative scheme (such as music), the foundation for the social process and thus for intersubjectivity—or does communication presuppose, on the contrary, the existence of a more fundamental social interaction, which would then be the basic intersubjective connection between man and fellowman? This question is obviously central, not only for philosophy but also for the social sciences in general. As regards the latter, if communication were fundamental to the existence of the social world, then the primary task of the empirical social sciences would be that of “linguistic” analysis, in one form or another. An empirical study of languages and their various usages would be fundamental to the study of individuals and groups, of social roles, and the like, for therein would be found the condition for the possibility of the social process as such; or at least, the communicative process would be the core of the social process.
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Thus one should be able to explain the emergence of meaning, and correlatively, of intelligence, in terms of the process of communication—by means, for instance, of a "conversation of gestures," as Mead attempted to do. Indeed, as Mead puts it, just because "Mind arises through communication by a conversation of gestures in a social process...—not communication through mind," the "awareness or consciousness of gestures is not necessary to the presence of meaning in the process of social experience." Meanings, constituted by means of the conversation of gestures, are "objectively there as a relationship between certain phases of the social act," and not first something "psychical."

But in order to give this "objective thereness" of meanings any sense, one must suppose, as Mead does, that the gestures and responses to gestures are themselves merely biological phenomena, intrinsically without meaning and with no meaning-endowing quality, yet constituting the matrix from which meaning arises. Mead goes on to contend, however, that the response to a gesture is the meaning of that gesture; by extension, the gesture itself must first be meaningful in order to be able to evoke a meaning (response). From this results the enigmas characteristic of Mead's "behaviorism." The interpretations of gestures, while supposedly meaning-endowing, are said to be merely "an external, overt, physical, or physiological process." But if the interpretations of gestures are merely physiological processes, it is a mystery how they could ever be meaning-endowing; and if they are meaning-endowing, the gestures cannot be merely, much less fundamentally, physiological in nature, even though they may have a physiological substratum. To be sure, Mead's principal point is well taken: meanings and even new sets of objects of common sense arise in and because of the social process, and especially the conversation of gestures. What is at issue, however, is the foundation of the social process. Mead's response that it is communication (in a broad sense) involves him in irresolvable problems, for communi-

8 George H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago 1934) p. 77; the quotations that follow are taken from pp. 50 and 76–81.
cation, as will be clear shortly, presupposes a more fundamental phenomenon: intersubjectivity.

Put most briefly, communication with another, in whatever way, must presuppose the existence of the Other as a possible recipient and interpreter of the communicated meaning. Accordingly, as Schutz clearly recognizes, there must be "some kind of social interaction which, though it is an indispensable condition of all possible communication, does not enter the communicative process and is not capable of being grasped by it."

It has been pointed out that communication occurs only in the reality of the outer world, and for this reason constitutes the core of "paramount" reality. This means that "any kind of communication between man and his fellowman . . . presupposes an event or a series of events in the outer world which functions, on the one hand, as a scheme of expression of the communicator's thought, and, on the other hand, as a scheme of interpretation of such thought by the addressee." It is not enough to say simply that the body is a "field of expression," for, as Schutz points out, this is ascribable to almost anything at all (a painter's landscape, a Japanese garden). To be a "field of expression" is not a quality inherent in things, but is rather an intentional characteristic, something meant, or intended, as such.

Almost everyone agrees that, apart from mental telepathy, knowledge of the Other—more generally, any encounter with the Other—is possible only through the medium of events occurring in or produced by the body. Thus in Mead's example of the wrestlers, events occur on the body of the one as events gearing into the outer world and thus perceivable and interpretable by his opponent, as events of such and such a kind having such and such a meaning and calling out in him these and those responses. All such phenomena, according to Schutz (following Husserl), are examples of "appresentational reference," or "appresentation," by means of which one object or state of affairs, now presented,

is "paired" (gepaart) with another object or state of affairs that is not now presented. By virtue of "pairing," the non-presented state of affairs becomes "appresented." The most obvious example of this is symbolization, analyzed in detail by Schutz in his "Symbol, Reality and Society."

As regards the present problem, Schutz believes that appresentation provides the clue for understanding how the Other is first constituted as such in my experience. The Other is given to me as a psycho-physical entity. His body is given in my experience originally, immediately, as a purely physical thing, as an object of sensuous perception. His mental life, however, is only co-present, that is, it is appresented as the psychical component of this concrete psycho-physical unity. By means of the automatic synthesis Husserl calls "associative transfer of sense," the Other's organism is automatically constituted for me as an organism similar to mine, and, more particularly, as a bodily organism (Leibkörper), such as I would have and experience (in the way I now experience my organism) were I over there where that physical body now is.

This appresentation is not, however, an inference, a specific process in which I actively infer on the basis of certain data to something else (the Other qua Other). Rather, on the basis of the automatic associative synthesis, the Other is constituted for my experience as already present, given, for my spontaneous activities. In fact, on the level at which this automatic transfer of sense occurs, every "body" acquires the sense of being an "organism" similar to mine. In the course of experience only certain organisms harmoniously verify this transferred sense; in others the transferred sense conflicts with their intrinsic sense, thus dis-verifying the synthesis. Of those that are harmoniously verified, certain of their parts become experienced as organs sensuously perceiving affairs that I would perceive were they my organs of sensuous perception. And, by means of this, I apprehend the Other as sensuously perceiving the very body that I perceive and

*Ibid. See also Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil (Hamburg 1954) sects. 33-46."
take to be his organism; as a consequence, the Other's bodily organism is constituted as the first common object. There thus occurs a cancellation of the transferred sense "mine," and in its place is constituted the sense "organism, not of my mind but of an Other's mind." The physical object, "the Other's organism" and events taking place in or on it, are now apprehended by me as expressing the Other's "spiritual 'I.'"

On this ground, so-called "cultural objects" point back by their very meaning to the human activity that produced them, and therefore we are always aware to some degree of our historicity. For the same reason we are able to understand such objects; indeed, as Schutz has shown, cultural objects can be understood only if one understands the purposes for which they were made. And this, he points out, is the source for Weber's "principle of subjective meaning": not only all human activities, but also all the products of these actions, intrinsically refer back to the subjective meaning given them by the actors and producers.

More important for Schutz, at this point, is the fact that by means of this appresentational reference through which the Other is first constituted as Other, "a communicative common environment" is established. Once the Other is apprehended as Other, it becomes possible for higher-level connections to develop. And it is precisely this environment that Schutz has described as the "paramount" reality, with its web of socially derived and socially approved knowledge, typical "recipes" for acting, thinking, and planning.

Nevertheless, we have still not come to the peculiarly social relationship that underlies, according to Schutz, these social relationships of a higher level. We have, to be sure, circumscribed the terrain: on the one hand, we have seen the typified stratification of the biographically determined situation; and, on the other, we have traced the fundamental constitutive basis for the apprehension of the Other. But all this, Schutz says, "constitutes merely the setting for the main social relationship."

I encounter and experience the Other's organism, and experi-
ence my self as experienced by the Other, only within the “face-to-
face” relationship, the relationship obtaining between any two or
more consociates whose worlds within actual and potential reach,
with their corresponding manipulatory spheres, partially overlap
and are thus shared, held in common. That is to say, the face-to-
face relation implies a community of time and space among con-
sociates—but in Schutz’s usage of this term it does not imply any
degree of intimacy, since it is equally applicable to the co-presence
of friends and of strangers.

Now, when certain events occur on, or are produced by, the
Other’s body, it is the complex time structure of this occurrence,
and its interpretation by the actors, which holds the clue to the
sharedness of the occurrence. As an illustration, consider verbal
communication. By a series of processes going on within the
Other’s inner durée, the Other articulates his thought step-by-step
(polythetically) into a verbal expression that is manifested by a
series of bodily movements occurring in the “outer” world, in
objective time (lip movements, voice inflections, arm gestures,
and the like). These events, the single phases of the speaker’s
“articulated thought,” are “polythetically . . . co-performed or
re-performed by the recipient, and thus a quasi-simultaneity of
both streams of thought takes place.” In and by the bodily move-
ments of “working acts,” that is, overt performances requiring a
bodily gearing into the outer world, the transition from inner
durée to objective time is accomplished, and these working actions
thereby partake of both. “In simultaneity we experience the
working action as a series of events in outer and inner time,
unifying both dimensions into a single flux which shall be called
the living present.” In the living present (lebendige Gegenwart)
I and my fellowman simultaneously live through a pluri-dimen-
sionality of time. “This sharing of the other’s flux of experiences
in inner time, this living through a living present in common,
constitutes . . . the mutual tuning-in relationship, the experience
of the ‘We,’ which is at the foundation of all possible commuника-
tion,” and thus of intersubjectivity.
The "mutual tuning-in" relation, then, involves three moments or aspects. The first is the series of events in inner time, a dimension in which the Other's thought is articulated polythetically, and in which the listener polythetically re-performs or co-performs the thought thus built up by the speaker. Second, this communicative process is an event in outer time, thus presupposing the face-to-face relationship, "which unifies the fluxes of inner time and warrants their synchronization into a living present." Third, and most important, there is thereby constituted a "We-relation" —a relation that transcends both of the individually unique biographical situations—in terms of which you and I, "We," share in a living present, which is our living present, the thoughts embodied in your speech. In the We-relation, which is the origin of intersubjectivity, our simultaneous partaking in each other's inner and outer dimensions of time constitutes the fundamental phenomenon: "We grow older together." To "be with" another is for Schutz to grow older with another.

Only by means of this "mutual tuning-in" relation is communication of any kind whatever possible; and thus only by means of it can the Other's body and its movements be interpreted as a "field of expression of events within his inner life." Accordingly, all other social relationships are derivative forms of the We-relation, and to each derivative form belongs a particular type of time structure, itself derived from the living present, the time perspective of the "We."

As a consequence of this foundation relation it becomes possible to define the meaning of the "alter ego." But before doing so it is in Schutz's view necessary to distinguish carefully between two essentially different kinds of attitudes: the "straightforward" and the "reflective." It is only in reference to Me that I and Others obtain the sense of being a "We"; it is only in reference to an Us, whose center I am, that Others stand out as "You"; and it is only in reference to You, who refer back to Us and to Me, that a "They" is constituted. In daily life, however, I am rarely, if ever, aware of these strata, or of the fact that only my existence
as a self in this world makes these relationships, and this relativity, possible. I simply live straightforwardly in my acts, busied not with my acts but with their various objects; I live in my acts directed straightforwardly to their objects. It is an overstatement to describe my usual straightforward attitude in terms of “I think” or “I feel” or the like; indeed, James speaks of an “It thinks,” and Dewey goes even further and speaks of an “on-going course of experienced things.”

I can, however, “stop and think”; that is, I may, while still remaining in the natural attitude, reflect on my acts and not live straightforwardly in them. Now, according to Schutz, my “self” appears; my acts, my beliefs, my feelings are revealed through reflection as mine. (It might be suggested, as Marcel does, for example, that not all reflection, ipso facto, has “my” self as its object, but rather only a specific kind of reflection, which he calls “second reflection” or pensée pensante.)

In my straightforward attitude I live in my acts as present; I am directed toward the immediate future and still have in my grasp (in Husserl’s phrase noch-im-Griff-habend) the immediate past, but the time dimension is the living present. In the reflective attitude, however, I grasp not my living present, but only and always the past, which was a present. I experience my acting and the objects thereof modo presenti; I experience my acts and myself as actor modo preterito.

Only in my straightforward attitude do I apprehend the Other as himself present, given. Thus, for Schutz, “the alter ego is that subjective stream of thought which can be experienced in its living present.” I experience the Other straightforwardly in the living present as that subjective stream of thought with which I share this present in simultaneity; that is, we grow older together. This experience of the alter ego in living simultaneity Schutz calls “the general thesis of the alter ego’s existence.” The thesis implies, he goes on, that “this stream of thought which is not mine shows the same fundamental structure as my own consciousness. This means that the other is like me, capable of acting and

thinking; that his stream of thoughts shows the same through and through connectedness as mine. . . . It means, furthermore, that the other can live, as I do, either in his acts and thoughts, directed towards their objects or turn to his own acting and thinking . . . that, consequently, he has the genuine experience of growing old with me as I know that I do with him.” 9 Thus I share the We-sphere straightforwardly, but I apprehend the I-sphere only reflectively.

III

On the ground of the mutual tuning-in relationship all other social relationships become possible—those pertaining to my contemporaries as well as to my successors and predecessors. Having explicated the ground for the experiencing of the Other, Schutz has explicated the ground for the fact that the world is experienced as common, not as my private affair, but as “our” world, the world for you and me, for “us,” and also for “them” and “you.”

Because of the intersubjective nature of the socio-cultural world, the knowledge (in the broadest sense) that any of us has is the result of a complex process of socialization. Knowledge is socialized, on the ground of the mutual tuning-in relation, by means of three fundamental “theses,” which, as I interpret Schutz, are three moments of the general thesis of the alter ego’s existence (it should be noted that Schutz uses the term “thesis” in the sense used by Husserl, especially in Ideen, 1, sect. 30). Though Schutz never put it in this way, these three theses all explicate, are so to speak the concrete working out of, the general thesis. In this way, I believe, Schutz’s investigations into the structure of the social world can be seen to be a part of the more fundamental problem of intersubjectivity.

The first of the three theses is the reciprocity of perspectives, or the structural socialization of knowledge. Taking it for granted that fellowmen exist, I take it for granted that objects are for others as well as for me, but also that these objects mean

something different for me and for them. The reason is twofold. In the first place, since I am here, the aspects I experience as typical of the object are different from those so experienced by the Other, who is there; certain objects are within my manipulatory sphere but not his, and vice versa. In the second place, our biographical situations differ, and therewith our systems of relevance and purposes at hand differ.

Commonsense thinking overcomes these limitations, however, by means of two fundamental idealizations. One is the interchangeability of standpoints. It is a basic axiom of commonsense thinking that the coexisting systems of coordinates can be transformed one into the other. Thus I take it for granted, and I assume my fellowman does the same, that he and I would have typically the same experiences of the common world if we changed places, thus transforming my here into his here, and his into mine. The other idealization is the congruency of the systems of relevance. I take it for granted, and I assume my fellowman does the same, that differences in perspective are irrelevant for our purposes at hand; that is, "We" assume we have selected and interpreted the actual or potential common objects in a "practically" identical way (identical for all practical purposes). These two idealizations constitute the thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives. It is obvious, on the other hand, that they have as their constitutive basis the mutual interlocking of inner and outer time dimensions, which, in turn, is founded on the constitution of the Other's organism as the first common object.

The second of the three theses is the social origin of knowledge, or the genetic socialization of knowledge. Only a small part of my stock of knowledge at hand originates with me; most of it is socially derived. I am taught how to define my situation (that is, how to define, in regard to the relative natural aspect of the world, the typical features that prevail in the in-group as the unquestioned but always questionable ambit of things taken for granted until further notice); and I am taught how typical constructs have to be formed in accordance with the purpose at hand.
and its system of relevances accepted from the anonymous viewpoint of the in-group (ways of life, recipes for acting, and the like). For this socialization the typifying medium par excellence is the common vernacular, a language of named things and events primarily, and thus of the typifications and generalizations prevailing in the in-group whose vernacular it is.

Finally, the third thesis is the social distribution of knowledge. Our actual stocks of knowledge at hand differ: some fields I know only by "acquaintance," others I really "know about" (in William James' terms), while about others I have only a blind belief. I am an "expert" in only a small area. Furthermore, my knowledge is at any moment structured into zones of clarity, distinctness, precision, originating in my prevailing system of relevances and thus biographically determined. The knowledge of individual differences is itself an element of commonsense experience: I know, for example, whom I have to consult in order to heal a wound, or to buy old coins. I thus construct types of the Other's fields of acquaintance, and of their scope and range, being guided by certain relevance structures experienced in terms of certain typical motives that lead to typical actions.

Thus the "general thesis of the alter ego's existence" as the unstated, unquestioned, taken-for-granted root of the commonness of the everyday world, by positing that the Other's subjective stream of thought shows the same fundamental structure as one's own, implies that our respective perspectives can in principle be exchanged without thereby altering, for our practical purposes, the objects, facts, and events that concern us at the moment. It implies as well that you, having your own unique biographically determined situation, have, like me, been taught how to define your situation, construct your plans of action, and so on, in accordance with the typifications peculiar to your in-group. Finally, it implies that you, like me, are an "expert" in this or that field, but that your knowledge, like mine, reveals typically similar zones of clarity, acquaintedness, and blind belief—and that in certain typically pre-defined situations you, follow-
ing certain typically pre-defined procedures and recipes, will call on me for advice or help, as I call on you in other circumstances. All social interaction is thus founded on the general thesis of the alter ego’s existence, and is concretely “worked out,” so to speak, by means of the three theses of socialization, the idealizations belonging to them, and the typifications constructed by actors on the social scene.

However, these theses, and especially the general thesis of which they are moments, are as such the ground for the commonness of the social world. This means that the belief in the Other, as another psycho-physical self like me, is never itself brought into question, never itself made thematic within the natural attitude. All doubtings and questionings regarding the Other and the common, intersubjective world leave untouched this fundamental belief in the Other, “our” world and its objects. In fact, says Schutz, man in his everyday, natural attitude makes constant and unthematic use of a specific *epoché*. He suspends all doubt of the world, its objects, and Others; he refrains from the doubt that they might be otherwise than they are assumed to be.

Accordingly, in order to raise the “problem” of intersubjectivity, it is necessary to make this specific “epoché of doubt” itself thematic; that is, it is essential, in order to apprehend intersubjectivity itself, to effect an epoché on the epoché of doubt, to refrain from participating in this fundamental belief in the Other and the world as a whole, and to take it itself as the theme for inquiry. Only by making intersubjectivity itself thematic is it possible to develop a genuine theory of intersubjectivity in the intramundane sphere, that is, a “constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude.” And this inquiry, a fundamental part of the systematic whole of phenomenology, is, as was indicated at the beginning of this discussion, at the heart of Schutz’s work.

IV

It is clear from what has preceded that the reciprocal interlocking of time dimensions is, for Schutz, the core phenomenon of inter-
subjectivity. Since intersubjectivity signifies an interlocking of time dimensions, it signifies an interlocking of perspectives, motives, and behavior—and ultimately of meaningfully connected actions into a system of meanings that constitutes "the" world as a world common to you and me.

Only in the face-to-face relation, however fugitive and superficial it may be, is the Other encountered as a unique individual, with his own biographically determined situation. In all other dimensions of the social world, the Other is experienced and apprehended as "typical," in terms of typical motives, attitudes, and behavior. Nevertheless, Schutz emphasizes, even in the face-to-face relation of consociates, the partners enter into social action with only a part of their respective personalities; that is, you and I encounter and have to do with one another most often in terms of "social roles." And even this is only half the story: my constructing the Other as a performer of social roles plays its part in my own self-typification. In defining the role of the Other, I myself assume a role; in typifying his behavior, I typify my own (becoming, for example, "a passenger," "a teacher," "a stranger"). Finally, these typifying constructs are themselves to a considerable extent socially derived and approved, some of them becoming institutionalized in the course of our on-going experience.

How these typifications are worked out at the level of social action is, of course, a crucial problem; but it calls for a more extensive analysis than can be given here.\(^{10}\) What occurs by means of this complex typification is, however, of great interest for a theory of intersubjectivity. For, hand in hand with an increase in typification, there goes, according to Schutz, an increase in anonymity and a decrease in the fullness of the relationship, such that, in a completely anonymous relationship, the individuals are taken by each other as interchangeable, that is, as "anyone." In such cases, since you could as well be Smith or Jones, and I Peter or Paul, n'importe qui, we cease to form what Schutz calls the

\(^{10}\) For such an analysis see Schutz's "Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," pp. 14–20.
"We-relation": this relation is inversely proportionate to the degree of typification arising through our actions. Thus a crucial problem arises. How is it possible for you and me to break through the masks of our social roles and to experience each other in a mutual relating that transcends the spheres of our respective private experiences and constitutes a We-relation? One would expect Schutz to hold that with a decrease in typification there would be an increase in fullness, and a consequent intimacy of the relationship. Unfortunately he did not explicitly engage this question; nevertheless I believe that there are grounds in his work for an answer. In this concluding discussion some indication can be given as to one direction, at least, toward which Schutz's indicated theory of intersubjectivity leads.

The clue to the way in which Schutz might have responded to such a question lies in the concept of "fullness," and, more generally, in the concept of mutually interlocking actions. The present interpretation of these concepts rests, as will be seen, on an interpretation of the "principle of subjective meaning" which Schutz does not seem to have emphasized.

All such interaction is, as was emphasized above, an interlocking of time dimensions, behavior, attitudes, and motives. In questioning and answering, for instance, I anticipate that the Other will understand my action (uttering an interrogation) as a question, and that this will induce him to respond in such a way that I may understand his behavior as a response. My "in-order-to motive" is, say, to obtain information ("How do I get the train to Chicago?") and this presupposes that his understanding of the question will become his "because motive" in performing an action "in-order-to" give me this information. Such interaction is based, then, on an idealization of the reciprocity of motives, which itself follows from the thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives, and, in turn, from the general thesis of the alter ego's existence.

More often, however, my in-order-to motives are more complex, involving many levels of motives (I want to get to Chicago in order to apply for a position, which, if I am successful, will change the...
course of my life). In this event it is clear that only I myself
know when my action starts, where it ends, and what its ultimate
significance is. Even if I confided in my partner, he would be
able to understand my action only by reconstructing the whole
stratification of my motives and plans. Thus the meaning of my
action is different for me, for my partner, and for an observer.

It follows that in everyday life there is only a chance that the
Other will understand me; in order for him to come to an under-
standing he must grasp the meaning my action has for me, the
one who does the acting. To the degree, however, that my fellow-
man is able to grasp this “subjective meaning” of my action, he
has succeeded in going beyond a more or less gross typification
of my behavior; or, as Schutz puts it, he has transformed a mere
“course-of-action” type into a “personal” type. This transforma-
tion, as I interpret Schutz, has the significance of an increased
“fullness” in the relationship; that is, you and I have entered
into a We-relation.

Here two problems arise. In the first place, how does this full-
ness arise, and what are its conditions for appearance? Second,
how does this fullness constitute a genuine We-relation? As to
the first question, there are indications in Schutz’s work that the
mutual tuning-in relation reaches a “fullness” to the extent that I
and my fellowman are able to grasp and understand the subjective
meaning of our respective actions. But, if this is not to become
an empty platitude, how is such understanding itself possible?

In order to grasp the concept of fullness, it seems fruitful to
turn to the work of Gabriel Marcel, who, in emphasizing that
the concepts of “the full” and “the empty” are far more descriptive
of human reality than any other,\textsuperscript{11} seems to use these concepts in
much the same way that Schutz intends them. Similarly, Marcel
has shown throughout his work that in so far as I regard the
Other as a mere object (in Schutz’s terms, as “typical” or “anony-
mous”), I tend to ignore him as \emph{this} person, and he becomes “just

\textsuperscript{11}Gabriel Marcel, \textit{Position et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique} (Paris
1949) P. 49.
anyone.” As a consequence of this reduction, our relationship becomes more and more “empty” (“typified” or “anonymous”), my fellowman becomes typified, and consequently I myself am typified (absorbed in “playing a role,” that is, in “shamming”). Conversely, the more I am able to understand him from his subjectivity (the subjective meaning his actions have for him), or as a Thou, the more intimate he becomes to me: “our” relationship becomes “fuller,” we are truly “with” one another, and we confront each other as persons.

But for this “fullness” to come about, it is not enough that you and I are merely willing to understand one another; we must each be able to do so (thus being enabling to one another). Furthermore, it is essential that each of us be both willing and able to be treated as a Thou by the Other: to “be with” the Other is not a mere matter of taking him as a Thou, but is something more, and perhaps more difficult, for it means also being taken as a Thou by him. To be able to give, freely and openly, is a rare enough virtue; but to be able to receive such a gift is even rarer. In order for you and me to “keep faith” with one another, to “remain faithful” to our We-relation by seeking to understand our respective subjective meanings, it is essential, to borrow Marcel’s terms, that each remain “available to” the Other: “being open to” (disponibilité) is the condition for “keeping faith with” (fidélité), for “being with,” the Other.12 Briefly, while the mutual tuning-in relation is a reciprocal grasping and understanding of the respective subjective meanings, the condition under which this tuning-in can occur is openness. In order to realize a We-relation with an Other, I must “be open” to him, “be available” for him to “call” or “appeal” to me. Here, I believe, Marcel enunciates the fundamental categories for an understanding of the genuine We-relation—appeal, response, and their foundation: care or concern.

This takes us to our second problem: having seen the funda-

mental condition for my understanding of the subjective meaning of my fellowman's action, and his understanding of mine, we can trace the way in which the consequent fullness constitutes a We-relation. For one to engage in mutual action and reaction with an Other is to appeal to him to recognize and attempt to understand the meaning this action has for the actor; that is, the Other must respond to the appeal in the way in which it is meant by the actor himself, and not pre-interpret it in typical ways. But in order to merit such a response the appeal must be made under the recognition of the responsibility it implicitly asks the Other to assume by his response. This recognition on the part of the one who appeals is itself a fundamental responsibility, which is contracted by the very fact that it is an appeal calling for a response.

In order to respond, however, the Other must "be able" (be open) to apprehend the appeal as such. Moreover, the appeal can be made only with recognition of the real possibility that it is ill timed, open to refusal, to betrayal by the Other, even, it must be emphasized, to the possibility that the Other may be unable to respond. Thus the genuine appeal is a free act, "without strings." The We-relation stands under the possibility, which is essential to it, of failure; it is accompanied by a fundamental risk, and therefore it is constituted as a test, or trial (épreuve); for this reason it is essentially subject to betrayal, by the Other as well as by myself.

Accordingly, to be open to the Other as a Thou, and thus to the subjective meaning of his actions, is possible only in so far as I "give him credit," at the outset and without strings, for being a person; that is, to be open to him is to care what happens to him as himself. I must make it possible in the first place for the Other to become himself; what happens after depends on this. But "care" is here no easy matter. To care for an Other is at once to put myself freely at his disposal (to be available to him) and to expect from him a mutually concerned response to this care (which may or may not occur); and it is at the same time in some way to give him, by my very making of myself open to him
(whether through an appeal or a response), the means of responding to this expectation. Holding myself open to the Other, I hold out to him the possibility for his own being open to me. Care, in this sense, is precisely a creative reciprocity in which, by my "tuning in" to the Other, and his to me, I in some way make it possible for him to respond freely to me: caring for him, I make it possible for him to be able to care for me (and, dialectically, for himself). I collaborate in his freedom, and he in mine, and it is precisely through freedom that he is truly Other and I truly myself.

Thus it is not sufficient, in order to realize the "fullness" of the We-relation, that I actively refrain from typifying my fellow-man's behavior and attempt to reach his subjective meaning, that I refrain from pre-judging and pre-interpreting him. More fundamentally, his action must be allowed to take its own shape, to be expressed as such. The Other must make it possible for me to respond, and I must make it possible in advance for him to appeal, by my very being open to him. This "must" expresses the condition without which the We-relation could not arise: "being open to," or availability. By "giving credit to," or "keeping faith with," the Other, as a Thou, a genuinely creative reciprocity becomes possible. This "mutual tuning-in relation," then, whose fundamental stratum is the interlocking of time dimensions, becomes an interlocking of mutually recognizing actions, that is, a mutual tuning-in of reciprocal concern: love.

The dialectical nature of this We-relation is, of course, more complicated than has here been indicated. These few remarks may serve to point out, however, the direction in which our two concluding questions can be answered, within the spirit, if not the letter, of Schutz's work. In the dialectics of appeal and response (of care), the mutual interlocking behavior of two consoiates in a face-to-face relation becomes a genuinely interlocking mode of conduct. It becomes, that is, a genuine mutual tuning-in relationship whereby "We," you and I, grow older together by caring what becomes of each other.